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Abstract  
  This paper seeks to argue the significance of platforms on emerging markets through a case 
study of the Shanzhai cell phone industry in Shenzhen, China. In this industry, value chains are 
being driven by both the technology platforms and the market platforms. The former include 
MTK baseband chipset, and so-called Shared PCBA and Shared Mould. The latter include the 
North Huaqiang Market and the Purchasing and Money Platform. Technology platforms greatly 
reduced the technological barriers to entry for independent design houses and system integrators, 
while market platforms markedly improved their poor marketing and purchasing abilities. Due to 
factors such as social networks, supporting industries, informality and platform governance, 
strong network effects have been exhibited in the two types of platforms, which have not only 
fostered numerous start-ups, but have also led to effective exploitation of emerging markets. 
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1. Introduction1 
Platforms can be defined as “building blocks that act as a foundation upon which 
other firms can develop complimentary products, technologies or services” (Gawer, 
2009, p.57). The extensive adoptions of the platform strategy have profoundly changed 
the model of innovations, the driving forces of value chains, and the basic pattern of the 
international division of labor. Currently, cutting-edge research on platforms is primarily 
concentrated on industries in developed countries, in particular the high-tech sectors 
(Gawer and Cusmano, 2002; Gawer, Eds. 2009). The purpose of this paper is to make 
the point that various technology platforms and market platforms have been growing 
rapidly in emerging markets, and are becoming an important impetus for innovation. 
Industry in developing countries should become an important field of platform study. 
Our argument stems from the fact that the socioeconomic system of developing 
countries has natural linkages with platforms. 
  First, the majority of consumers in developing countries are in the low income class, 
whose demand for commodities is extremely large. As previous studies have suggested, 
accompanying the development of an industry platform, key components such as the 
Intel chipset has been designed as a black box adopting integral technology, while 
peripheral products have become highly modular and standardized, with increasingly 
lower prices (Tatsumoto et al., 2009). The result is that the more the platform advanced 
in an industry, the more its final products became a commodity, which to a large extent 
helped to exploit the demand of emerging markets.  
More important is that the structure of production and distribution within emerging 
markets is highly fragmented, lacking huge local industrial or commercial capital 
capable of driving the whole value chain. The overwhelming majority of the economic 
actors are countless small merchants, small producers, and their reserve army. These 
small firms primarily gather in the informal sector (Bennett, 2010), and are not only 
deficient in production equipment and technological knowledge, but also lack the means 
of marketing and purchasing. Platforms, in this sense, can precisely complement the 
poor managerial resources of these firms and reduce the technological and marketing 
barriers for them. 
  Because of the two reasons mentioned above, many success stories concerning 
platforms have emerged in developing countries, particularly in China. The 
phenomenon by which many assemblers share the same type of key component 
(platform sharing) has been broadly observed in industries such as automobiles and 
                                                   
1 This paper is an output of the joint research project on “The Dynamism of the Consumer Electronics Industrial 
Cluster Development in Pearl River Delta” conducted by Institute of Developing Economies and Shenzhen 
Semiconductor Industry Association during the period between 2010 and 2011. 
home appliances (Marukawa, 2007). By also utilizing the market platform of so-called 
Specialized Markets, a large number of regions, such as Yiwu (daily necessities), 
Danyang (eyewear), and Yuyao (moulds), have rapidly grown into the largest industrial 
clusters in the global or domestic market within the short period of a mere 30 years 
(Ding, 2010).  
The most typical example has appeared in the cell phone industry. After 2005, a 
so-called “Shanzhai cell phone” rapidly became the main force in the Chinese and other 
emerging markets. It has become a byword for imitation, inferior goods and the 
infringement of intellectual property. By the end of 2010, however, shipments of 
Shanzhai cell phones amounted to more than 400 million units, accounting for about 
two-thirds of the total volume of China’s local phone makers. The production of the 
Shanzhai cell phone is based primarily on the MTK baseband chipset (a typical 
technology platform), and its sales rely heavily on the North Huaqiang Market (a typical 
market platform). The main producers and distributors of the Shanzhai cell phone are 
thousands of small firms with only dozens of employees. Most of the producers are 
located in Shenzhen, forming the world’s largest cell phone industrial cluster.  
 Little previous study has been conducted on the Shanzhai cell phone. As the only 
literature in English, Gao (2011) analyzed the Shanzhai cell phone industry from the 
sociological perspective. Gao pointed out that the nature of the “Shanzhai Regime” is a 
new form of informal economy which emerged under the background of the information 
revolution and globalization. This study precisely apprehended a number of key factors 
which support the Shanzhai regime, including the Wintel system, the long tail market, 
the industrial cluster and the specialized market, although these factors are not 
explained within an integrated framework. On the basis of Gao (2011), this paper aims 
to for the first time, analyze the Shanzhai system through the concept of the platform. 
By using this powerful tool and a series of related concepts, we were able to gain a 
deeper insight into the following three aspects of the Shanzhai cell phone. 
First, we succeeded in uncovering various platforms that support the Shanzhai system, 
in addition to the well-known MTK chipset and the North Huaqiang Market.  
Second, we laid emphasis on the analysis of network effects, clarifying the conditions 
under which a platform achieves critical mass. 
Third, we paid particular attention to the emerging economies-specific factors that 
affect the features of the production and distribution system of the Shanzhai cell phone.  
Since the majority of firms in the Shanzhai cell phone industry remain in the informal 
economy, there is no existing statistical data, and the implementation of a large sample 
questionnaire survey is also difficult. We thus adopted the methodology of fieldwork in 
order to grasp the whole picture. Based on fragmentary surveys from the previous four 
years, we conducted intensive fieldwork in Shenzhen during the period between 
September, 2010 and February, 2011. In this paper, we only note the source of 
information when it has been gathered from one specific firm. The sources of 
information on the general situation synthesized from multiple firms will be omitted. 
 
2. Platform and small firm growth in developing countries  
  Before proceeding with the case study, we analyze the role of platforms in small firm 
growth in developing countries in general.  
A technology platform is a core technology or core component in a product system 
(Gawer and Cusmano, 2002). In developing countries, the R&D capabilities of small 
firms are generally poor. Therefore, the broader the scope of R&D covered by the 
technology platform, the lower the technological barriers to entry for small firms will 
become. In the context of the manufacturing sector in developing countries, the 
technology platform is essentially a one-sided platform.2 As users of a one-sided 
platform are homogeneous, the more producers that make use of a platform, the more 
knowledge and information concerning the platform will be shared between them. 
Consequently, an increasing number of new users will be attracted to the platform, thus 
generating a direct network effect. A stronger direct network effect will cause a 
technology platform to become more powerful, which can further help small producers 
in developing countries to conduct technology research and product development, and 
thus reduce the technological barriers to entry for them. 
The market platform is a market intermediary, taking the form of a two-sided or 
multi-sided platform (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, Hagiu, 2007). A market platform owns 
two or more heterogeneous user groups, such as buyers and sellers. In the 
manufacturing sector, sellers refer to producers. The larger the number of producers in a 
market platform, the more intense the competition, which brings about cheaper prices 
and more options for buyers. Consequently, an increasing number of buyers will be 
attracted to the platform. On the other hand, the larger the number of buyers in a 
platform, the lower the sales risk becomes and the richer will be the market information 
brought to the producers. As a result, an increasing number of producers will be 
                                                   
2 In developed countries, the core component is likely to be a multi-sided platform, as long as peripheral product 
makers are able to adjust their products to the new modular architecture designed by the component maker. Under 
this circumstance, both the final goods assemblers and the peripheral products makers are complementors to this core 
component platform. In developing countries, however, this situation does not necessarily occur. This is because most 
of the peripheral product makers are small local firms, who not only have no business relationships with the core 
component maker, and therefore receive no instruction, but are also incapable of transforming their goods to 
correspond to the new architecture. 
attracted to the platform, thus generating an indirect network effect.3 A stronger indirect 
network effect will cause a market platform to become more powerful, which can help 
small producers in developing countries to exploit new markets, while lowering the 
purchasing cost for small buyers. 
The technology platform and the market platform can only display network effects by 
reaching the necessary minimum network size, namely the Critical Mass. The factors 
that affect achievement of critical mass and the generation of network effects depend 
heavily on the institutional context. The factors derived from the experience of the cell 
phone industry in China will be clarified in this paper. 
When studying the manufacturing sector of developing countries, the distinction 
between the technology platform and the market platform is important. In developed 
countries, the two types of platforms are usually integrated into a single body, such as 
video game consoles, the Windows operating system, Intel’s IC chipset and the Cloud 
Computing Platform. A platform could be a foundation for complementors to develop 
new products, while helping its complementors on one side of the platform to transact 
with complementors from the other side in order to exploit a new market. 
  In developing countries, however, the technology platform and the market platform 
are generally separated. This resulted from the comparative advantage of the 
international division of labor. R&D requires the investment of a large amount of funds 
and the long-term accumulation of human capital. Hence, even with a technology 
platform that is targeting an emerging market, the leading firms in developed countries 
are still the only economic actor capable of carrying out R&D. In contrast, marketing 
and purchasing requires credits, business networks, and a deep understanding of local 
consumption behavior. Therefore, it is more likely that a market platform will emerge 
inside developing countries. 
 
3. General situation in the Shanzhai cell phone industry 
A cell phone named BlockBerry was developed by the so-called Harvard 
Communication Company. President Barack Obama, whose portrait is being printed in 
the most eye-catching position of the PR poster, appears to have been appointed as the 
image character of the phone. This is a model case for the Shanzhai cell phone made in 
Shenzhen, China. Currently, the Shanzhai cell phone has become a very popular topic in 
China, with various appellations such as the black cell phone, illegal cell phone, cell 
                                                   
3 Although a pure market platform can also generate a direct network effect, it is not as strong as that of a pure 
technology platform. This is because the critical information for a market platform user is always disseminated by 
their trading partners on the other side of the platform. 
phone copy-cat, miscellaneous cell phone and the gray handset.4 Shanzhai cell phones 
often evade tax and official quality testing, imitating international brands with exact 
replicas, but at low prices and with uneven quality. Many Shanzhai producers do not 
have their own technology, and simply assemble cell phones at workshops or small 
factories.  
These images reflect some of the features of the Shanzhai cell phone, but are 
incomplete. Shanzhai does not necessarily mean that the cell phone is of poor quality or 
is an imitation. In recent years, the failure rates of Shanzhai cell phones have been 
improved to one tenth the level compared to the initial stage.5 At the 2011 Mobile World 
Congress, a solar smart phone developed by Umeox, a Shanzhai producer from 
Shenzhen, raised broad concerns in the mass media (MyDrivers.COM, 2011). Simcom, 
an independent design house in the Shanzhai system, has begun to supply to formal 
phone makers such as Lenovo (China) and Sharp (Japan).  
There is always high upward mobility between the small firms in the Shanzhai system 
and large firms in the formal sector. Many Shanzhai producers have already transformed 
into formal producers and have begun a branding strategy. The former Shanzhai 
producers, Tianyu, OPPO, Goinee, Guohong, and BBK ranked number four, six, seven, 
eight and ten respectively within China’s top ten local cell phone companies in terms of 
shipments in 2010 (iSuppli, 2011).  
Due to this high mobility, it is difficult to distinguish precisely between the Shanzhai 
system and the formal system. Shanzhai cell phones adopt various technologies, such as 
GSM, CDMA, WCDMA and TD-SCDMA. Of these, the GSM-based phones are in the 
overwhelming majority. In 2010, 590 million GSM-based baseband IC chipset units 
were supplied to Chinese manufacturers. Among these, the shipments of IC chipsets for 
the top ten local brand cell phone manufacturers were 184.3 million units (iSuppli, 
2011).6 If we define the local phone makers below rank number 11 as Shanzhai makers, 
then at least 400 million Shanzhai cell phone units were manufactured in China in 2010.  
In addition to mainland China, Shanzhai cell phones have also gained considerable 
market share in most of the developing countries in a short time. For example, in the 
Indian market, accompanying the increase in the import of Shanzhai cell phones, the 
share of the top three international brands (Nokia, Samsung and LG) dropped from 
nearly 100% to 60% in the three recent years up to 2010. Instead, Chinese brands such 
as G-Five and Lephone gained a total share of 15%. On the other hand, by making use 
of original design manufacturing firms in the Shanzhai system, nearly 200 Indian 
                                                   
4 Gao (2011) gives a detailed explanation of the meaning of Shanzhai in its Chinese context. 
5 Author interview with the president of the Shenzhen cell phone association (November, 2010). 
6 This data includes both the GSM-based IC and other technology-based ICs. 
companies have transformed from pure distributors into cell phone brand owners. As a 
result, within the Indian market, the share of local brands (e.g. Micromax, Spice, 
Karbonn and Lava) have quickly increased to 25%.7  
    
4. Nature of the Shanzhai system 
4.1 Shanzhai cell phone value chains  
Although it is difficult to measure the Shanzhai cell phone industry quantitatively, its 
qualitative definition is clear-cut. We consider that the nature of the Shanzhai system is 
nothing but a platform-based distinct production and distribution system which differs 
greatly from the traditional model.   
Cell phone R&D includes five processes, namely chipset design, software and system 
design, printed circuit board (PCB) hardware design, industrial and manufacturing 
design (ID/MD), and product project management (including product definition, parts 
procurement, outsourcing management of industrial design and production, and project 
control).  
Traditionally, the world’s leading cell phone companies such as Nokia, Motorola, and 
Samsung are highly vertically integrated, having all of the above five functions. With 
the progress in communication technology, most leading cell phone makers have 
outsourced chipset design to independent chipset manufacturers, and sometimes 
outsource some ID/MD tasks to independent industrial design companies. They then 
tended to specialize in project management, software and system design, and PCB 
hardware design. The cell phone value chains are being driven firmly into the hands of 
these top makers. 
  In contrast, within the Shanzhai system, such a closed value chain has completely 
disintegrated, both vertically and horizontally. In the upstream section of the chain, 
Media Tek (MTK), the leading chipset maker from Taiwan, and its followers such as 
Spreadtrum from mainland China, are providing baseband chipsets which have 
conducted chipset design, software and system design, and PCB hardware reference 
design with a turnkey solution. Thousands of engineers are employed by these top chip 
makers. 
The chipsets are sold to 500 Independent Design Houses (IDHs) located in Shenzhen 
or Shanghai, who merely hire dozens or hundreds of staff (Table 1). IDHs are engaging 
in PCB hardware design and some simple software design. They are also in charge of 
the production of PCBA (printed circuit board + assembly). IDHs purchase hundreds of 
parts in dozens of categories from the sales departments of Taiwanese and Shanghai 
                                                   
7 Data provided at a technology forum held by Spreadtrum in 2010. 
makers in Shenzhen. Since both are complicated, the parts procurement is sometimes 
outsourced to specialized Purchasing and Money Platforms (see below) and PCBA 
production is outsourced to specialized Surface Mount Technology (SMT) factories.  
  PCBAs are then sold to 2000 cell phone System Integrators (SIs) clustered in 
Shenzhen, usually hiring not more than a few dozen staff (Table 2). Among them, only 
350 firms have obtained production permission from the Chinese government. SIs do 
not necessarily have an R&D department and only partially take charge of the product 
definition, supply chain management, project management and sales. According to the 
contents of the PCBA, SIs ask industrial design companies to design various body styles 
and arrange for mould factories to produce the moulds. Furthermore, they themselves 
purchase the screen module, camera, electro-acoustic devices, mechanical parts, and 
other parts, which are generally made in Shenzhen and neighboring areas, and assemble 
them as a whole cell phone. Assembly is sometimes outsourced to outside assembly 
plants.  
  With regard to sales, 600,000 buyers come to the North Huaqiang Market per day. 
Relying on the distribution networks, composed of the North Huaqiang Market in 
Shenzhen, the electronic markets in China’s local cities, various provincial and 
city-level sales agents and Mom-and-Pop shops, Shanzhai cell phones are unfailingly 
circulated to every nook and cranny of China and other emerging markets.  
 
4.2 Technology platforms  
Baseband chipset platform 
  The above-stated highly disintegrated Shanzhai cell phone value chains are being 
driven by both the technology platforms and the market platforms. Section 4.2 discusses 
the former, which includes the chipset platform and the so-called “Shared PCBA and 
Shared Mould.” 
The baseband chipset is the key component of cell phones. As Table 3 suggests, the 
Taiwanese firm MTK has outshined all others in the Chinese GSM-based baseband 
chipset market. This is because MTK succeeded in the platformization of the cell phone 
chipset and in promoting it with a turnkey solution.  
As a multi-media chipset firm, MTK was spun off from United Microelectronics 
Corporation as its IC design department. After succeeding in developing a controller IC 
for DVD players, MTK has grown into the largest IC fabless company in Asia. As a part 
of its diversification strategy, MTK began to develop a cell phone chipset in 2001. The 
firm integrated the baseband IC and the multimedia application processor into a single 
chipset, packaging the operating system and various applications such as an MP3 player 
and phone camera driver into its chipset software. The MTK platform was a 
revolutionary simplification in the development of the cell phone (Imai and Hsiu, 2007). 
When MTK began to promote the chipset platform to mainland China in 2003, 
however, it encountered various difficulties. On the one hand, the Chinese cell phone 
brand makers have adopted the IC chipset and the solution from leading IC 
manufacturers such as TI and Infineon. They did not have confidence in the functions 
and quality of the MTK platform. On the other hand, a large number of local small firms 
lacked the ability to make hardware design and software design on the basis of the MTK 
platform. In view of this situation, MTK went on to develop a turnkey solution, which 
contains the phone motherboard hardware reference design, the software source code, 
and other design notices for a complete cell phone design. As a result, the IDHs that 
adopted the MTK platform and turnkey solution became able to start mass-production 
almost immediately. Their workloads have also been greatly reduced. 
In order to promote this chipset platform, MTK itself further established an IDH in 
Taiwan. Although the quality and functions of the MTK chipset was still inferior to 
those of the leading European and US firms, it was very efficient. In 2003, the IDHs 
that adopted other baseband chipsets generally took six to nine months, or even a year, 
to develop a phone, while only three to four months (six months at the most) were 
required for the Taiwanese IDH created by MTK. As a result, most of the mainland 
China’s IDHs tended to adopt MTK platforms and the Shanzhai cell phone industry has 
thrived.8 While the IDH succeeded in promoting its chipset, however, MTK soon 
withdrew from this company, as it has decided to specialize in the chipset market. 
Gawer and Cusmano (2002) pointed out that in order to achieve platform leadership, 
four levers are important, namely, the scope of the firm, product technology, 
relationships with external complementors, and internal organization. To adopt this 
framework, we can confirm that this company was at least successful with respect to the 
first and the third lever. Concerning the scope of the firm, MTK has dramatically 
broadened the scope of its baseband chipset in view of the inferior capabilities of the 
firm’s users in mainland China. With regard to the relationship with its suppliers, what 
MTK attempted to do was enter the IDH complimentary field in order to tip the market, 
but withdrew quickly to avoid competing with its complementors. 
 
Shared PCBA and shared mould (SPSM) 
  SPSM is a variant technology platform in the Shanzhai system. There are various 
situations under which IDHs and SIs use SPSM. The first situation is a legal case. When 
                                                   
8 Author interview with the general manager of the wireless communications division of MTK (December, 2006). 
IDH has developed a new type of PCBA, the SI does not necessarily pay a deposit or 
guarantee to buy out all the PCBAs. In order to avoid these risks, the IDH sometimes 
sells PCBAs to several SIs simultaneously, so that the PCBA becomes a shared PCBA. 
Using this shared PCBA, the SIs downstream may make different moulds and design 
differentiated phone bodies. However, they can also share moulds together in order to 
distribute the expensive mould-making fees. In this case, the mould becomes a shared 
mould.  
The other situation is to imitate popular brand cell phones and is thus illegal. Once 
Nokia or Apple have developed a strongly-selling product, some IDHs or SIs, or even 
mould makers will soon imitate a copycat PCBA and mould with a closely similar 
design, specification, user interface and user menu. The true functions and performance 
of the copycat and the normal product may, however, differ greatly.  
  SPSM is only likely to emerge in developing countries. The SPSM developers do not 
change the fundamental architecture of the product at all. Neither the PCBA interfaces 
nor the moulds have been standardized, nor have the related components been 
modularized. Since there is knowledge spillover between users, the SPSM generates 
direct network effects. However, it is obvious that products based on SPSM are highly 
homogeneous, and that their performance is imaginably unstable. Only in emerging 
markets, where there are large numbers of low-level producers and low-income 
consumers, can this kind of platform be long-standing. 
 
4.3 Market platforms 
North Huaqiang Market  
In China, almost every important industrial cluster has a large wholesale market 
known as the Specialized Market. Not only merchants, but also a large number of small 
producers operate booths directly in the specialized markets, for the purpose of the sales 
of local products. The specialized markets are closely linked with traditional 
marketplaces in cities and rural areas in China and other developing countries. Like 
most of the successful platforms, the commodities traded in the specialized markets 
have often gained a dominant share in the domestic or global market (Ding, 2010).  
In Shenzhen, there is also a specialized market which is the major market platform 
driving the Shanzhai cell phone value chain. The market is located in North Huaqiang 
Avenue, Shenzhen, and consists of 32 sub-markets and 30,000 booths dealing in 
electronic parts, cell phones and other digital products. North Huaqiang Market was 
established in 1988 as a small electronic parts market, but has currently grown into a 
huge market with an annual transaction volume of 120 billion RMB. Most of the 
merchants in China’s electronic markets are obliged to come to the North Huaqiang 
market for purchasing. It is said that “If the North Huaqiang Market sneezed, all the 
electronic markets would catch a cold.”  
The seven cell phone sub-markets within the North Huaqiang Market had annual cell 
phone sales amounting to 30 to 40 billion RMB in 2009, which does not include the 
sales of SIs located around the markets.9 These markets have played a central role in the 
sales of the Shanzhai cell phone. The shipments of Shanzhai cell phones in Shenzhen in 
2010 reached about 400 million units, and the price of each phone is about 200 RMB. 
Therefore, at least half of the Shenzhen cell phones were sold from this market. In 
general, overseas and domestic buyers visit the market or purchase directly from the SIs 
in North Huaqiang Avenue. In the case of domestic trade, most of the cell phones are 
wholesaled to provincial sales agents. With the exception of a small number of brand 
makers, the territory system of sales is not being adopted in China’s cell phone industry. 
Each province has at least 100 agents, and one provincial agent covers 40-50% of the 
area of the province. Under the provincial agent, there are further city or county-level 
agents and distributors.10  
 
Purchasing and money platform (PMP)11 
A PMP is a kind of cell phone parts trading company, and is essentially a matching 
platform that facilitates IDHs and PCB parts suppliers in trading with each other. PMPs 
are primarily located in Shenzhen and neighboring areas, as most of the SMT factories 
are clustered in this area. It is estimated that there are a total of 100 PMPs providing 
purchasing and finance services for the whole Shanzhai system. 
Because most of the IDHs are very small, they do not have the bargaining power for 
lowering the purchasing price, are unable to pay the license fees to MTK for purchasing 
chipsets, and neither do they have enough staff to purchase large quantities of parts and 
materials. PMPs therefore take charge of the parts procurement in their place. Before 
procurement, the IDH pays a deposit of around 20 to 30% of the total expenses to the 
PMP. This large amount of money is generally received from the SI in advance. After 
the procurement is completed, the IDH collects the residual expenses from the SI and 
pays the PMP, including a commission fee of 2 to 3% of the total expenses. In this sense, 
the PMP is merely a purchasing agent and does not share in the purchasing risk. 
 
5. Network effects in the Shanzhai system 
                                                   
9 Author interview with the director of the North Huaqiang Market managing committee (September, 2010). 
10 Author interview with the sales manager of a large-scale SI in Shenzhen (November, 2011). 
11 Author interview with a manager of a PMP (January, 2011). 
5.1 The mechanism of network effects 
The MTK platform 
Of the four platforms in the Shanzhai system, the MTK chipset and the North 
Huaqiang Market have generated particularly strong network effects and have become 
platform leaders in each industry. In this section, we discuss the mechanism through 
which the two platforms generate network effects and the factors that strengthen these 
effects.  
We firstly discuss the case of MTK. The MTK platform owns simultaneously the 
properties of the hardware platform and the software platform. The direct network 
effects are particularly observed in the software platform. The users of the MTK 
platform are IDHs. Based on the MTK software platform, IDHs engage in debugging, 
the development of various complementary softwares, and the optimization of software 
performance (in order to improve the hardware functions). The direct network effects 
are generated precisely during these processes. 
Some IDHs obtain licenses from MTK and others do not. Concerning debugging, the 
licensed IDHs interact actively with MTK. IDHs report on the bugs and solve them with 
the support of MTK’s technical staff. Through the intermediary of MTK, the 
achievements of debugging are then accumulated on the platform and shared by other 
IDHs. In China, the protection of intellectual property remains poor, and inter-firm labor 
markets are very advanced. Un-licensed IDHs are able to share the achievements of 
debugging quickly through the job-hopping of engineers. Complimentary software 
developed on the MTK platform cannot be diffused to other IDHs through the 
intermediary of MTK, but the software can be shared rapidly by all IDHs simply by 
employing job-hopping engineers. 
The more the IDHs adopt the MTK platform, the fewer the bugs and the more 
sharable complimentary software will accumulate on the platform. As a result, an 
increasing number of IDHs will be attracted to the platform. This is a typical direct 
network effect. Many IDH owners are in profound recognition of this point and are very 
proud of it. One IDH owner commented, “The engineers that engage in R&D on the 
MTK platform are not merely from a single company. In the whole China, thousands of 
engineers are carrying out development around this platform.”12 
 
North Huaqiang Market 
As a multi-sided platform, the main users of the North Huaqiang Market include 
buyers (small cell phone merchants from the domestic and overseas market), sellers (SIs 
                                                   
12 Author interview with an IDH owner in Shanghai, a former engineer of the Longcheer Group (September, 2009). 
and small wholesalers in the market), and service providers.13 
  The indirect network effects between buyers and sellers in the North Huaqiang 
Market are obvious. The more SIs and small wholesalers clustered in the market, the 
more intense the competition, the cheaper the price of cell phones, and the broader the 
options the buyers can choose from. As a result, an increasing number of buyers have 
been attracted to Shenzhen. On the other hand, the more buyers that come to the North 
Huaqiang Market, the fewer the risks SIs and small wholesalers need to take on, and the 
more abundant distant market information that will be brought to the sellers. As a result, 
an increasing number of sellers will be attracted to the market. This strong indirect 
network effect can be confirmed by the change in the number of buyers and booths 
(namely the sellers). When it was established in 1988, there were only 180 booths in the 
North Huaqiang Market, and the annual number of buyers was 30,000 (SSZYEC, 1989). 
In 2010, there were 30,000 booths in the market and the number of visitors per day had 
increased to 600,000. Of these, the number of pure buyers was 10,000.14 In the case of 
the Mingtong cell phone market, there were 110,000 to 120,000 buyers per day at the 
peak. 
As Karnani (2007, pp.91-92) has precisely pointed out, demand in developing 
countries is “geographically dispersed and culturally heterogeneous.” The purchasing 
power of each consumer is small, and the main actors responding to poor consumers are 
the numerous small merchants.15 The North Huaqiang Market, however, can easily deal 
with the difficulties of distribution and marketing through the indirect network effect. 
Due to this effect, a large number of buyers, who brought about both the scattered small 
orders and information about emerging markets, have been attracted to Shenzhen. By 
trading with these buyers, SIs can easily enter a new market without constructing their 
own sales networks. On the other hand, simply by communicating with these buyers and 
watching the salability of the phones in the market, SIs and IDHs can obtain timely 
market information from any location in the emerging markets. Indeed, this 
information-gathering advantage has greatly stimulated the designs of the Shanzhai cell 
phone, matching them with demand in the emerging markets (Table 4). 
 
5.2 Social networks 
  Not every platform can easy achieve a critical mass and generate network effects 
(Evans, 2009). There are four factors that affect technology and market platforms in 
                                                   
13 SIs do not necessarily operate booths in the market, but their offices or sales departments must be located around 
North Huaqiang Avenue, and they are able to contact buyers directly. 
14 Author interview with the director of the North Huaqiang Market managing committee (September, 2010). 
15 This point concerning small merchants was mentioned to the authors by Professor Hubert Schmitz at Sussex 
University. 
generating network effects in the Shanzhai system, namely, social networks, supporting 
industries, informality and platform governance. This sub-section firstly focuses on 
social networks.  
In general, the more closely network members are connected, the stronger the direct 
network effects generated (Evans 2009, p.105). The rapid spread of the MTK platform 
clearly proved that this point makes sense. Most of China’s IDHs have directly or 
indirectly spun off from the Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE) 
Corporation and Motorola China.16 As a first wave, a number of IDH owners spun off 
in 1999, but more than 90% went bankrupt. The few survivors, such as the Longcheer 
Group, became China’s leading IDHs. In 2004, the second wave of spinoffs occurred. 
This time, most of the start-ups survived and thrived. They then cultivated an increasing 
number of IDHs in Shenzhen and Shanghai.  
 As they have originated from the same company, the owners of these IDHs are both 
competitors and partners. They often communicate with each other to share information 
and managerial resources. Thus, as soon as one IDH adopted the MTK platform, a large 
number of IDHs belonging to the same network also tended to adopt it. The MTK 
platform therefore soon reached the critical mass. These IDH owners also maintain 
frequent communication in order to solve problems that occur during the R&D process 
of the MTK platform.17 This further strengthens the direct network effect. 
  Social networks also affect the market platform to generate indirect network effects. 
Compared to the MTK platform, on which the users are engineers with a high 
educational level, the majority of sellers in North Huaqiang Market, especially the 
owners of Sis, are traditional merchants with similar geographical origins. These 
regional groups are rarely educated at universities, while their networks extend 
nationwide, or even worldwide. In North Huaqiang Market, the major regional groups 
engaging in SIs are from Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province, Chaozhou in Guangdong 
Province, Hunan Province, and the three Northeast China provinces.  
Taking the Wenzhou group as an example, there are more than 100,000 Wenzhou 
people doing business in Shenzhen. Of these, more than 50,000 are engaged in the 
electronics industry.18 It is estimated that among Shenzhen’s 2,000 SIs, nearly 1000 are 
run by people from Wenzhou. At the same time, Wenzhou people may have founded 
300 to 500 cell phone-related firms, from parts makers to wholesalers. Of Wenzhou’s 
SIs, 90% are from the same county of Pingyang in Wenzhou.  
                                                   
16 Author interview with an IDH owner in Shanghai, a former employee of the Longcheer Group (September, 2009). 
17 Of course, the results of complementary software development will not be communicated. The diffusion of this 
software relies more on job-hopping engineers. 
18 Information on the features of the Wenzhou network was gathered from an interview with an SI opened by people 
from Wenzhou (November, 2010). 
Wenzhou merchants are always sensitive to market conditions and disseminate 
market information immediately to each other without the least hesitation. As soon as an 
opportunity is discovered, a large number of Wenzhou people are able to enter the sector 
first as a group, sometimes even quite blindly. In the case of the cell phone, during the 
period between 2004 and 2005, rumors in Pingyang suggested that the cell phone would 
offer great business opportunities. As a result, people from Pingyang who were involved 
in different kinds of businesses in various places in China moved to Shenzhen, where 
they tended to set up SI businesses.  
A Wenzhou merchant described this feature vividly: “This is like the ‘frog 
psychology’ of Wenzhou people. You croak, I croak, and everybody croaks. Then, the 
market will prosper and expand. Any industry that wants to thrive in China must rely on 
the Wenzhou network.” He also stressed the high speed of the Wenzhou network in 
entering a market. “We always enter a market right before its expansion. Wenzhou 
people are very adept at earning the first pot of gold, which makes the most money.” 
From the phrases “enter a market right before its expansion,” or “earn the first pot of 
gold,” it is obvious that although Wenzhou merchants do not have knowledge of 
platforms and network effects, they clearly recognize the advantage of their social 
networks. It is precisely the immediate information sharing between network members 
that enables a platform to achieve a critical mass quickly and thus tip the market. 
 
5.3 Supporting Industries  
As China’s first special economic zone, Shenzhen has attracted a large amount of 
investment from foreign companies (in particular from Hong Kong) and central 
government-owned companies since the 1980s. These firms helped Shenzhen to 
accumulate ample human and technological resources in the electronics industry.  
Taking advantage of these resources, local private firms began to extensively appear 
in the consumer electronics sectors from the 1990s. The first wave appeared in 1995, 
when hundreds of VCD player factories were founded in Shenzhen and neighboring 
areas. The production volume of VCDs amounted to 600,000 units in 1995，and then 
increased explosively to 6 million units in 1996 and 10 million units in 1997.19  
After VCD players, the production booms of DVD players, telephones, beep pagers, 
PDAs, and MP3/MP4 players have occurred in succession. The majority of these 
consumer electronics firms are small assemblers lacking in capital, technology and 
production skills. In order to supply the necessary materials and parts, many suppliers, 
                                                   
19 This dramatic growth in the VCD industry also resulted from the introduction of a combination of turnkey 
solutions and SPSMs, which indeed is the original model for the Shanzhai system. 
such as SMT factories, plastic mould factories, and industrial design companies, which 
previously supplied to the foreign founded or central-government owned companies, 
began to supply to these small assemblers. 
As a result, except for some high-end components, such as some PCB-related parts, 
screen modules, and cameras, all the peripheral products necessary for cell phone 
production became clustered in Shenzhen and neighboring areas. Some assembly plants 
for other consumer electronics goods also tend to receive orders from the cell phone 
sector. As a result, the number of firms in Shanzhai cell phone’s supporting industries in 
Shenzhen has risen to about 6,000. A similar situation can also to some extend be 
observed in Shanghai and its neighboring areas. As soon as MTK developed the chipset 
platform and released the turnkey solution, IDHs and SIs appeared one after another in 
Shenzhen.  
The spatial proximity of these IDHs and SIs greatly stimulated both the direct and 
indirect network effect. This is because a large part of the knowledge and information 
exchanged between the IDHs is tacit knowledge (e.g. debugging know-how). Most 
knowledge and information exchanged between SIs and buyers in the North Huaqiang 
Market is similarly tacit knowledge (e.g. cell phone user experiences). As it is more 
efficient to diffuse tacit knowledge in face–to-face communications between firms, the 
clustering of IDHs and SIs thus strengthened network effects on the MTK platform, and 
the North Huaqiang Market. 
 
5.4 Informality  
As Gao (2011) has argued, the Shanzhai industry is a new form of informal economy. 
From the perspective of the platform, this unique informality is also a crucial factor in 
strengthening network effects, and can result in low fixed costs and low sunk costs in 
the Shanzhai system. Low fixed costs lower the barriers to entry and enable firms to 
endure fierce price competition. On the other hand, low sunk costs can reduce the risks 
of entry. Consequently, the whole industry can accommodate numerous 
un-differentiated small firms in the state of a perfect competitive-like market.20  
 
Low Fixed costs 
Platforms can save greatly on fixed costs such as the cost of R&D and the cost of 
marketing and purchasing. In the Shanzhai system, however, not only the platform itself, 
                                                   
20 Evans (2009, p.116) points out that most of the B2B sites in US market failed as the sellers of these sites have 
fixed costs and thus cannot survive in the price competition brought about by the B2B auctions. The case of IDHs in 
the Shanzhai system contrastingly suggests that a platform will generate strong network effects when the fixed costs 
are extremely low. 
but informality can also cause the fixed costs of firms to decrease. As for IDHs, 
compared to the expensive license fees of leading chipset makers, which amount to 
millions of dollars, MTK license fees are only 200,000 dollars. Even so, the number of 
MTK licensed customers (IDHs and some brand phone makers) is a mere 134.21 The 
remaining un-licensed IDHs can either acquire MTK chipsets from PMPs, the North 
Huaqiang Market, or licensed companies. Without licensing, they cannot obtain direct 
technology support from MTK. However, they can still get a software development kit 
indirectly from previous colleagues and friends in licensed IDHs.  
 The fixed costs of SIs are also low. Among 2000 SIs, a mere 350 firms have obtained 
production permission from the Chinese government, and need to send their products 
for quality testing.22 Most SIs only test the quality of cell phones themselves, which not 
only saves on the testing fees of 250,000 RMB, but also the testing time of 20 days.  
 
Low sunk costs 
Another cost characteristic that resulted from the informality of the Shanzhai system 
is that investment in the Shanzhai system does not easily become a sunk cost. Most cell 
phone parts are standardized,23 and IDHs are often running multiple projects with 
multiple customers. Therefore, even though sluggish stock material appears or SIs do 
not pay residual expenses, IDHs can flexibly deploy parts and materials to other 
projects. Moreover, because the PCBA can be shared, an IDH can sell it to multiple SIs 
such that neither the costs of PCB design nor parts procurement will become sunk costs.  
On the other hand, SI investments also do not easily become sunk costs. The largest 
risk for SIs is the one-shot mould investment, which costs 150,000 to 300,000 RMB. If 
the project fails midway, or the order is too small, this investment would become a sunk 
cost. However, since several SIs can share one mould or can purchase popular phone 
bodies directly from the market, the risk of investments in moulds are also low. 
 
5.5 Platform governance 
In this paper, we define platform governance as a combination of platform regulation 
and platform services. Platform regulation refers to the regulation of the access of 
complementors and avoiding opportunistic complementor activities on the platform.24 
Platform services refer to the provision of customization, maintenance, logistics, 
                                                   
21 Data provided by SZSIA. 
22 Author interview with the president of the Shenzhen cell phone association (November, 2010). 
23 This standardization of cell phone parts is the result of the modulation of whole electronic industries and is not 
caused by the platformization of cell phone chipsets. 
24 Boudreau and Hagiu (2009) discussed regulations on multi-sided platforms. We consider that regulation is also 
indispensable for the one-sided platform. 
banking and other services that and increase the value of a platform. Services can be 
provided by the platform owner itself or by independent service providers. In the latter 
case, indirect network effects will be exhibited between the service providers and the 
platform users (Suarez and Cusmano 2009, pp.85-86). Appropriate platform governance 
can greatly reduce transaction costs and help to strengthen network effects. 
 
Platform Regulation 
Although it is an informal economy, the efforts of platform governance can still to 
some extent be confirmed in the Shanzhai system. We focus on platform regulation first. 
Concerning the MTK platform, the license fee is very low and MTK have taken almost 
no measures to clamp down the numerous un-licensed firms. MTK prefers to treat this 
as a marketing strategy than simple inaction. 
In the North Huaqiang Market, the actors in charge of platform governance include 
the managing companies of each sub-market, the managing committee of the North 
Huaqiang Market, the branches of the Intellectual Property Bureau (IPB) and the 
Bureau of Market Supervision and Management (BMSM). The last three organizations 
are public sector organizations.25 As with MTK, these governors basically do not 
regulate the access of sellers as long as they can pay the booth rent and tax. On the other 
hand, the buyers do not need to pay any fees.  
  Concerning regulations on the interactions between buyers and sellers, each cell 
phone market has established a consumer protection platform to deal with disputes 
between them.26 Each booth-keeper is obliged to return, exchange or repair goods if 
quality problems occur. As for public sector regulations, both the IPB and the BMSM 
strictly clamp down on imitation goods as soon as foreign firms complain about the 
infringement, while ordinarily they may be turning a blind eye to imitation goods. 
 
Platform Services 
MTK generally guarantees good service for licensed users. It ensures the supply of 
chipsets at a cheaper price, and has set up a technology department to support 
debugging.  
In order to respond to the requirements of its Chinese customers, MTK always acts in 
                                                   
25 In China, the competition for fiscal incomes between local governments is very intense. The behavior of 
government departments is more like a firm than a public sector organization. This paper, therefore, does not 
distinguish between private regulation and public regulation, as with Boudreau and Hagiu (2009, p.170). Information 
on regulations and services implemented by government departments was all gathered in an author interview with the 
director of the North Huaqiang Market managing committee (September, 2010). 
26 All the information on platform regulation and platform services conducted by the managing companies of the cell 
phone markets was gathered in an interview with the vice director of the managing company of the Mingtong Market 
(November, 2010). 
a more customer-oriented manner than other leading chip makers. Licensed IDHs have 
numerous opportunities to communicate with MTK staff and feedback various market 
and technology information. In order to help their customers exploit emerging markets, 
MTK has established sales and research subsidiaries in mainland China, India and 
Dubai, in addition to other developed countries. One IDH owner compared MTK and an 
European chip maker as follows: “The European maker was positioned in the high-end 
market. It forecasts industry trends and makes decisions, unlike MTK, which changes 
its policies flexibly according to the requirements of its customers. The European 
maker’s products are just for demos，far from the requirement of customers.”27 
  On the other hand, various complimentary services are being provided in the North 
Huaqiang Market. As for after service, many SIs have established repair and 
maintenance units in the cell phone markets and in China’s major cities. In 
medium-sized and small cities, the broken cell phone will be sent to Shenzhen for repair. 
As the logistics system is very advanced, it takes no longer than a mere 72 hours from 
the acceptance of a phone to return to the consumer. As for exported phones, as the cost 
of returning phones to Shenzhen is too expensive, SIs generally price the cell phones 
more cheaply, and provide extra parts for repair overseas. 
  In regard to logistics services, there are nearly 100 logistics firms clustered in a street 
behind North Huaqiang Avenue. As cell phones are light, air cargo is sometimes utilized 
for their transportation. The banking system is also advanced in North Huaqiang Market. 
Of cell phone transactions in the market, nearly 70% of the means of payment are 
through bank transfers and only 30% are by cash. 
  Lastly, the governors of North Huaqiang Market are actively publicizing and 
promoting the market. In order to propagate North Huaqiang Avenue as China’s top 
electronics avenue, the managing committee is releasing a regular Electronics 
Transaction Index, which reflects changes in prices of commodities traded in the North 
Huaqiang Market. This has helped to enhance domestic awareness of the market. On the 
other hand, the managing companies of each sub-market have actively propagated 
themselves overseas. For example, the Mingtong market has advertised itself in India, 
the Middle East and Latin America. One cell phone market in Dubai has become almost 
a branch market in which most of the cell phones are purchased from Mingtong. 
 
6. Implications of the Shanzhai cell phone industry 
  The story of the Shanzhai cell phone has helped us to gain a more profound 
understanding of the significance of platforms for developing countries. The situation of 
                                                   
27 Author interview with a medium-sized IDH owner in Shenzhen (November, 2010). 
MTK in the Shanzhai cell phone industry is partially similar to the situation of Intel in 
the PC industry. The MTK platform and turnkey solution has resolved most of the 
technology problems concerning both the hardware and software design. As a result, the 
barriers to entry for cell phone design and manufacturing have been heavily reduced, 
and hundreds of IDHs and SIs have emerged rapidly. 
However, there are also significant differences between the two companies. First, as a 
top-level maker, the Intel platform has not only facilitated the spread of the PC in 
emerging markets, but also helped its main users, such as the Taiwanese main board and 
notebook PC manufacturers to enter the high-end market in developed countries rapidly 
(Tatsumoto et al, p.361). On the contrary, MTK platforms were initially provided to the 
Shanzhai producers and are still aimed at the middle and low-end market. In order to 
acquire more emerging market users, MTK had to turn a blind eye to the existence of 
both the large number of unlicensed IDHs and the widespread SPSM. 
Second, combined with the Windows operating system, Intel has continuously 
occupied a monopolistic position in the PC chipset market. In contrast, there are several 
competitors in the cell phone chipset market (Table3). Especially Spreadtrum, as the 
sole chip maker from mainland China, increased its shipments explosively to 110 
million units in 2010.28 What factors enabled Spreadtrum to achieve such rapid growth? 
Does this mean that developing countries are able to foster their own technology 
platform leaders? Will the international division of labor concerning platforms change? 
All these questions need to be answered in future studies. 
The story of the Shanzhai cell phone also tells us that in addition to technology 
platforms, market platforms are also indispensable for exploiting emerging markets. In 
the Shanzhai system, market platforms include the North Huaqiang Market, which 
improved the marketing abilities of small firms, and the PMP, which helped small firms 
to purchase parts and materials with lower costs. 
Of these, the former is more important. We repeatedly emphasize that the demands of 
emerging markets are culturally heterogeneous, geographically dispersed, and each 
consumer has little purchasing power (Karnani, 2007). As the case of the Shanzhai cell 
phone suggests, only the market platform, taking the form of the traditional marketplace, 
is able to respond to such a demand. The North Huaqiang Market attracted from 
emerging markets a large number of small cell phone buyers, who unceasingly carry 
orders and distant market information to the SIs and IDHs. These small firms are thus 
able to develop various novel products suited to demands in emerging markets. MTK 
                                                   
28 As a result of the competition, the MTK chipset price dropped from between US$6 and US$8 (2007-2009) to 
between US$3 and US$4 in 2010. 
then further improved their platform, using the information fed back by these customers. 
Since MTK did not have the ability to enter the developed countries’ markets, it may be 
easily judged that without the existence of the North Huaqiang Market, this company 
would never have emerged, let alone become a platform leader in the Chinese market. 
The platform leadership of the MTK chipset and the North Huaqiang Market have 
been achieved through the generation of strong network effects. The interaction between 
IDHs generates direct network effects on the MTK software platform, and the 
interaction between SIs and buyers generates indirect network effects on the North 
Huaqiang Market. There are four factors that have affected the generation of network 
effects in the Shanzhai system.  
The first factor is the social network. In the Shanzhai system, there are two major 
types of networks, namely, the engineers’ network, and the networks of regional 
merchant groups. As the case of Shanzhai cell phone suggested, social networks have 
particular significance for developing countries. Because of overpopulation, social 
networks in most developing countries have more nodal points than networks in 
developed countries. Once members of a social network have begun to adopt a platform, 
it is easier for a developing country platform to achieve a critical mass. Moreover, the 
credit system in developing countries is not as advanced as in developed countries, and 
thus information and knowledge shared within the same social network will be more 
accurate, which helps to strengthen network effects.  
The second factor is the clustering of supporting industries, which enabled SIs and 
IDHs to set up business more easily and to agglomerate more closely. Consequently, the 
diffusion of tacit knowledge between them became increasingly smooth, thus enhancing 
network effects. In the Shanzhai system, the formation of supporting industries was 
caused by the development of local private firms, which obtained technology and 
human resources from foreign-established and central government-owned companies. 
This suggests that whether a platform can generate network effects smoothly and 
achieve platform leadership or not in developing countries depends heavily on the 
effects of the knowledge and technology spillover from the formal sector.  
Informality is the third crucial factor. Although platforms can save on firms’ R&D or 
marketing costs, the platform alone is inadequate for enabling a large number of small 
firms to start up new businesses. In the Shanzhai system, nothing but the unique 
informality of industries in emerging economies, including the ignorance of intellectual 
property and the avoidance of regulations, caused the ubiquitous low fixed costs and 
low sunk costs. Low fixed costs lowered the barriers to entry and enabled small firms to 
endure fierce price competition, while low sunk costs reduced their risks of entry. It 
must be pointed out, however, that low fixed costs and low sunk costs also enables firms 
to make an easy exit from an industry. Just as we were finalizing this paper, news came in 
that one third of the Shanzhai cell phone system integrators suddenly withdrew or went 
bankrupt during the period between the end of 2010 and mid-2011. Does this mean the 
termination of the Shanzhai system? Or will this system survive along with the evolution 
of both the technology platforms and the market platforms? Sustained attention will be 
required to arrive at the correct answers to these questions. 
The fourth factor is platform governance, which consists of platform services and 
platform regulation. In the Shanzhai system, although the provision of platform services 
is good, platform regulation, including the regulation of user access and the clamp down 
on imitation goods, remains inadequate. This will not hinder the development of 
platforms at the initial stage. Since market demand for consumer goods in developing 
countries is highly stratified, firms producing poor quality goods and high quality goods 
can entirely avoid competition with each other by entering a different market segment. 
Therefore, the phenomenon of bad money driving out good money will not occur for the 
time being.29 In the long run, however, once the Lewisian turning point is reached, the 
demand for low-end goods in a market will decrease greatly (Lewis, 1954). Under this 
circumstance, if platform owners do not formulate further regulations, the platforms will 
no longer be an engine for innovation, but rather will be thoroughly reduced to a 
breeding ground for counterfeit and shoddy products.30 Coincidently, China is standing 
precisely at this very turning point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
29 Contrastingly, in developed country markets, in which demand is more homogeneous and oriented toward high 
quality goods, the forgiveness of poor quality goods will soon cause the phenomenon whereby bad producers drive 
out good producers. See the case of Atari in the video-game console market in the US (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). 
30 In China, the platform regulation in some market platforms has made remarkable progress. As for the case of 
eyewear, see Ding (2010). 
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Table1. General Situation of System Integrators in the 
Shanzhai Cell Phone Industry 
Shipments/month  
Number of 
staff 
Number of 
firms 
500,000 ~  300 ~ 1, 000 50 
50,000 ~ 500,000 50 ~ 200 300 
 ~ 50000 5 ~ 30 1, 650 
Source: Estimated by Shenzhen Semiconductor 
Industrial Association (SZSIIA)  
 
Table 2 General Situation of Independent Design Houses in the Shanzhai 
Cell Phone Industry 
Shipments/month  Number of 
staff 
Number of firms 
in Shanghai 
Number of firms 
in Shenzhen  
1,000,000 ~ 300 ~ 1, 000 10 15 
100,000 ~ 
1,000,000 
50 ~ 200 80 45 
~ 100000 5 ~ 30 110 240 
Source: Estimated by SZSIA. 
 
 
Table 3 Market Share of GSM-based Baseband Chipsets in China   
(Millions of Units)   
Vendor 2007 
Market 
share 2008 
Market 
share 2009 
Market 
share 2010 
Market 
share 
MTK 121.4  41.6% 222.2  76.2% 300.3  50.9% 430.0  72.9% 
Spreadtrum 25.9  8.9% 18.9  6.5% 35.1  5.9% 110.0  18.6% 
Infineon 28.2  9.7% 30.2  10.4% 22.8  3.9% 23.0  3.9% 
Qualcomm 6.8  2.3% 5.8  2.0% 6.2  1.1% 13.0  2.2% 
ST-Ericsson 14.1  4.8% 8.2  2.8% 5.3  0.9% 2.5  0.4% 
TI 19.2  6.6% 6.0  2.1% 0.0  0.0% 0.0  0.0% 
Mstar             10.0  1.7% 
Others 1.8  0.6% 0.3  0.1% 3.5  0.9% 1.5  0.3% 
Total 217.4    291.6    373.2    590.0    
Source: iSuppli(2011) 
 
Table 4 Unique Functions of the Shanzhai Cell Phone 
Functions Emerging market 
consumer demands 
Functions Emerging markets 
consumer demands 
Multiple 
SIM cards 
and multiple 
standbys 
Developing countries 
often have many cell 
phone operators. Charge 
plans differ greatly for 
each operator  
Flashlight Developing countries 
have very frequent 
electric power cuts  
Large 
speaker 
Cell phones are often used 
as music players, while 
living conditions for the 
poor are noisy. 
Currency 
detector 
To check counterfeit 
banknotes 
Long 
standby 
The poor like to play with 
the cell phone for a long 
time, but charging the 
battery is inconvenient  
Buddhism 
/worship cell 
phone 
To respond to diverse 
religious beliefs 
Large touch 
panel 
The elderly and the poor 
are not used to using the 
keyboard 
Analog TV To improve the 
unexciting leisure life in 
developing countries 
Multiple 
cameras 
The young like to take 
pictures of themselves 
Cell phones 
shaped like 
cigarette packs, 
cars and Fuwa 
(the Olympic 
mascot). 
Poor people’s fashion 
Source: Authors. 
 
